Jennie Robinson Faber
7a626b0a82
The reconcile-payments cron POSTs to /api/internal/reconcile-payments with an X-Reconcile-Token header but no csrf-token cookie/header. The CSRF middleware was 403ing the request before the route handler could check the shared secret — breaking Fix #6 (daily reconciliation cron). Found while wiring the Dokploy scheduled task. The Netlify scheduled function would have hit the same 403; nobody noticed because the site hasn't been deployed yet. Removing CSRF protection from /api/internal/ is safe: every route under that prefix is machine-to-machine and gates on its own shared-secret header. CSRF protects against browser-driven cross-origin POSTs, which isn't the threat model for these endpoints. Tests: 758 passing (CSRF middleware unit tests still cover the exempt list shape).
49 lines
1.4 KiB
JavaScript
49 lines
1.4 KiB
JavaScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS'])
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// Routes exempt from CSRF (external webhooks, magic link verify, machine-to-
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// machine internal endpoints with their own shared-secret auth)
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const EXEMPT_PREFIXES = [
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'/api/helcim/webhook',
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'/api/slack/webhook',
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'/api/auth/verify',
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'/api/internal/',
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'/oidc/',
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]
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function isExempt(path) {
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return EXEMPT_PREFIXES.some(prefix => path.startsWith(prefix))
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}
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export default defineEventHandler((event) => {
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const method = getMethod(event)
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const path = getRequestURL(event).pathname
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// Always set a CSRF token cookie if one doesn't exist
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let csrfToken = getCookie(event, 'csrf-token')
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if (!csrfToken) {
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csrfToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')
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setCookie(event, 'csrf-token', csrfToken, {
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httpOnly: false, // Must be readable by JS to include in requests
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'lax',
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path: '/'
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})
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}
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// Only check state-changing methods
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if (SAFE_METHODS.has(method)) return
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if (!path.startsWith('/api/')) return
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if (isExempt(path)) return
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// Double-submit cookie check: header must match cookie
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const headerToken = getHeader(event, 'x-csrf-token')
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if (!headerToken || headerToken !== csrfToken) {
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throw createError({
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statusCode: 403,
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statusMessage: 'CSRF token missing or invalid'
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})
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}
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})
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