Main's middleware-level auth limiter (5 req / 5 min, IP-only) duplicated
the handler-level limiter introduced earlier on this branch (5/hr IP +
3/hr per-email, blocks email enumeration across IPs). Drop the
middleware version and let the handlers own it.
Added ALLOW_DEV_TEST_ENDPOINTS bypass to the rateLimit utility so
parallel E2E runs from 127.0.0.1 don't exhaust per-IP/email budgets,
mirroring the existing middleware bypass.
Trimmed the obsolete middleware auth test; handler-level coverage lives
in tests/server/api/auth-{login,verify}.test.js. Switched IP-isolation
test to the payment path so it still exercises the limiter.
The HelcimPay modal loads from secure.helcim.app, but the CSP only
listed myposjs.helcim.com (script/connect) and secure.helcim.com
(frame, likely a stale typo). Add secure.helcim.app to script-src,
connect-src, and frame-src so the join flow's payment modal can load.
Set up Vitest with server (node) and client (jsdom) test projects.
79 tests across 8 files verify all Phase 0-1 security controls:
escapeHtml sanitization, DOMPurify markdown XSS prevention, CSRF
enforcement, security headers, rate limiting, auth guards, profile
field allowlist, and login anti-enumeration. Updated SECURITY_EVALUATION.md
with remediation status, implementation summary, and automated test
coverage details.
