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6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
9b79ae6bf4 refactor(auth): rename paymentBridge → signupBridge
After commit 90acc35 issued the cookie for $0 signups too, the "payment"
framing was wrong — there's no payment in a $0 signup. The cookie is
about bridging the gap between signup-form submit and email verify, not
about payment specifically.

Changes:
- setPaymentBridgeCookie  → setSignupBridgeCookie
- getPaymentBridgeMember  → getSignupBridgeMember
- Cookie wire name        payment-bridge → signup-bridge
- JWT scope               payment_bridge → signup_bridge

Touches both /api/helcim/subscription (signup activation) and
/api/helcim/initialize-payment (paid Helcim checkout) which both consume
the cookie. In-flight signup sessions started before this lands will
need to re-submit the form (cookie name mismatch); cutover hasn't
happened yet, so the only impact is local dev sessions.
2026-04-30 15:31:54 +01:00
208638e374 feat(launch): security and correctness fixes for 2026-05-01 launch
Day-of-launch deep-dive audit and remediation. 11 issues fixed across
security, correctness, and reliability. Tests: 698 → 758 passing
(+60), 0 failing, 2 skipped.

CRITICAL (security)

Fix #1 — HELCIM_API_TOKEN removed from runtimeConfig.public; dead
useHelcim.js deleted. Production token MUST BE ROTATED post-deploy
(was previously exposed in window.__NUXT__ payload).

Fix #2 — /api/helcim/customer gated with origin check + per-IP/email
rate limit + magic-link email verification (replaces unauthenticated
setAuthCookie). Adds payment-bridge token for paid-tier signup so
users can complete Helcim checkout before email verify. New utils:
server/utils/{magicLink,rateLimit}.js. UX: signup success copy now
prompts user to check email.

Fix #3 — /api/events/[id]/payment deleted (dead code with unauth
member-spoof bypass — processHelcimPayment was a permanent stub).
Removes processHelcimPayment export and eventPaymentSchema.

Fix #4 — /api/helcim/initialize-payment re-derives ticket amount
server-side via calculateTicketPrice and calculateSeriesTicketPrice.
Adds new series_ticket metadata type (was being shoved through
event_ticket with seriesId in metadata.eventId).

Fix #5 — /api/helcim/customer upgrades existing status:guest members
in place rather than rejecting with 409. Lowercases email at lookup;
preserves _id so prior event registrations stay linked.

HIGH (correctness / reliability)

Fix #6 — Daily reconciliation cron via Netlify scheduled function
(@daily). New: netlify.toml, netlify/functions/reconcile-payments.mjs,
server/api/internal/reconcile-payments.post.js. Shared-secret auth
via NUXT_RECONCILE_TOKEN env var. Inline 3-retry exponential backoff
on Helcim transactions API.

Fix #7 — validateBeforeSave: false on event subdoc saves (waitlist
endpoints) to dodge legacy location validators.

Fix #8 — /api/series/[id]/tickets/purchase always upserts a guest
Member when caller is unauthenticated, mirrors event-ticket flow
byte-for-byte. SeriesPassPurchase.vue adds guest-account hint and
client auth refresh on signedIn:true response.

Fix #9 — /api/members/cancel-subscription leaves status active per
ratified bylaws (was pending_payment). Adds lastCancelledAt audit
field on Member model. Indirectly fixes false-positive
detectStuckPendingPayment admin alert for cancelled members.

Fix #10 — /api/auth/verify uses validateBody with strict() Zod schema
(verifyMagicLinkSchema, max 2000 chars).

Fix #11 — 8 vitest cases for cancel-subscription handler (was
uncovered).

Specs and audit at docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-25-fix-*.md and
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-25-launch-readiness-fixes.md.
LAUNCH_READINESS.md updated with new test count, 3 deploy-time
tasks (rotate Helcim token, set NUXT_RECONCILE_TOKEN, verify
Netlify scheduled function), and Fixed-2026-04-25 fix log.
2026-04-25 18:42:36 +01:00
f34b062f2a fix(events): enforce series-pass, hidden, and deadline gates
Pre-launch P0 fixes surfaced by docs/specs/events-functional-test-matrix.md
(Findings 1, 2, 3).

1. Series-pass bypass (Finding 1 / matrix S1 P3): register.post.js now
   loads the linked Series when tickets.requiresSeriesTicket is set and
   rejects drop-in registration unless series.allowIndividualEventTickets
   is true or the user has a valid pass. Data-integrity 500 if the
   referenced series is missing.

2. Hidden-event leak (Finding 2 / matrix E11): extract loadPublicEvent
   into server/utils/loadEvent.js. All five public event endpoints
   ([id].get, register, tickets/available, tickets/reserve,
   tickets/purchase) now go through the helper, which 404s when
   isVisible === false and the requester is not an admin. Admin detection
   uses a new non-throwing getOptionalMember() in server/utils/auth.js
   (extracted from the pattern already inlined in api/auth/status.get.js).

3. Deadline enforcement + legacy pricing retirement (Finding 3 / matrix
   E8): register.post.js and tickets/reserve.post.js delegate gating to
   validateTicketPurchase (which already covers deadline, cancelled,
   started, members-only, sold-out, and already-registered);
   tickets/available.get.js gets an explicit registrationDeadline check.
   Legacy pricing.paymentRequired 402 branch removed from register.post.js.
2026-04-20 19:03:34 +01:00
6f9e6a3d98 feat(events): guest accounts for public event registration
Non-members who register for an event now get a persistent identity:
with consent, a status:"guest" Member is upserted and an auth cookie is
set so the "You're Registered" state survives a page refresh.

Tiered auto-login matches passwordless-auth norms — auto-login is only
safe when the account holds no privileges:
- New email → create guest + cookie
- Returning guest → cookie
- Existing non-guest (active/pending/etc.) → attach ticket only, no
  cookie, confirmation email includes a sign-in link

Guests are gated on status === "guest", so admin/middleware code that
keys on status === "active" naturally excludes them. Guests are also
treated as non-members for ticket pricing/validation to prevent picking
up member-only pricing on their second registration.
2026-04-16 21:23:31 +01:00
d31b5b4dac fix: use private helcimApiToken for all server-side Helcim API calls 2026-04-04 13:37:34 +01:00
26c300c357 Implement OWASP ASVS L1 security remediation (Phases 0-2)
Auth: Add requireAuth/requireAdmin guards with JWT cookie verification,
member status checks (suspended/cancelled = 403), and admin role
enforcement. Apply to all admin, upload, and payment endpoints. Add
role field to Member model.

CSRF: Double-submit cookie middleware with client plugin. Exempt
webhook and magic-link verify routes.

Headers: X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection,
Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on all responses. HSTS and CSP
(Helcim/Cloudinary/Plausible sources) in production only.

Rate limiting: Auth 5/5min, payment 10/min, upload 10/min, general
100/min via rate-limiter-flexible, keyed by client IP.

XSS: DOMPurify sanitization on marked() output with tag/attr
allowlists. escapeHtml() utility for email template interpolation.

Anti-enumeration: Login returns identical response for existing and
non-existing emails. Remove 404 handling from login UI components.

Mass assignment: Remove helcimCustomerId from profile allowedFields.

Session: 7-day token expiry, refresh endpoint, httpOnly+secure cookies.

Environment: Validate required secrets on startup via server plugin.
Remove JWT_SECRET hardcoded fallback.
2026-03-01 12:53:18 +00:00